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German cabinet on August 28, 1919, Horsing warned that the Poles might attempt to present the Allies with a fait accompli by seizing and holding Upper Silesia with force.3
When word of the uprising reached Paris, the Allies requested Berlin to permit a prompt Allied occupation of Upper Silesia without waiting for ratification of the Treaty.4 The German government refused not only for reasons of domestic prestige but also because of important political and economic considerations. Berlin hoped to use the remaining months of its control over the area to influence the inhabitants in a pro-German sense; and, at the same time, the Germans tried to mine as much coal and to gather as many foodstuffs from the area as possible.5 On the other hand, the German government could not afford to be overtly uncooperative with the Allies. It therefore agreed to allow an Allied military commission to make an inspection tour of Upper Silesia, and the commission in turn issued a report in mid-September taking a moderate and conciliatory position toward both sides. The suggestions of the commission for restoring peace were generally followed by both Germans and Poles, and an uneasy calm return to the area.6 But the uprising had furnished a preview of more serious clashes to come.
In the late summer and autumn, Horsing demanded repeatedly that communal elections be held in Upper Silesia despite grave doubts in 6To the Polish side, the commission report urged that the Poles stop their nationalist agitation from across the border, that they withdraw their infiltrators from the area, and that they await patiently the arrival of the plebiscite commission. To the Germans it urged a general amnesty for those involved in the uprising, permission for Polish refugees to return to their homes and jobs in Upper Silesia, and the avoidance of any reprisals against the Polish population (Schulthess' Europdischer Geschichtskalender [1919] , 1: 399-400).
Berlin concerning the likely outcome of the vote. Horsing hoped that Germany-and particularly the Social Democrats-would win a propaganda victory while the area was still under his administration, and he designated the first anniversary of the German revolution as the date of the balloting. The effort to identify allegiance to Germany with loyalty to the socialist movement proved a failure, however, for the election results showed a large majority for Polish candidates. Moreover, the Social Democrats suffered severe losses to the more radical Independent Socialists.7 Although the Allies refused to recognize the election on the grounds that it might unduly influence the plebiscite results, the fiasco brought about Horsing's resignation. Having failed to promote the German cause by an appeal to socialism, the Weimar Coalition thereupon turned to its other major party, the Catholic Center, for a new commissioner in Silesia. Thereafter, an increasingly important part of German propaganda in the area involved an appeal to Catholic loyalties.8
After the Treaty of Versailles finally took effect on January 10, 1920, the interallied plebiscite commission assumed control of Upper Silesia in early February. Only three of the Allied powers were ever represented on the commission. At the peace conference it had been decided that no Japanese representative would be included; and, with the refusal of the U.S. Senate to ratify the treaty, American participation also fell by the wayside.9 The occupation forces were overwhelmingly French, as were in the administrative personnel of the commission. The French sent 11,000 troops, the Italians 2,000, and the British none; of the twenty-one district controllers, eleven were French, five Italian, and five British. by issuing a call to arms to the Polish population, and for a week young Polish bands roamed the eastern part of the province, upset civil administration, and committed occasional atrocities. The main object of Polish efforts was the disbandment of the German security police since it was largely through that body that Germans continued to exercise influence in the area. The interallied commission had promised to replace the security police with a gendarmerie composed equally of Poles and Germans, but what the commission had not yet carried through peacefully the Polish insurgents accomplished by force. In every area where they gained control, they dissolved the old German police system and established their own."
In Germany, despite widespread animosity toward the Poles and sympathy for the Russians, the government adopted a strictly neutral policy in the Soviet-Polish war. A complete Soviet victory against the Poles would have brought the Bolshevik threat to the very boundaries of Germany, which itself was torn by mass strikes and civil unrest. The German minister in Warsaw delivered an urgent warning against any temptation to support the Bolsheviks and argued that Poland was necessary as a buffer state between Germany and the Soviet Union.'2 Active intervention in the war was never a serious possibility for Germany in its weakened state in 1920. Berlin did warn repeatedly, however, of the economic consequences of the riots in Upper Silesia. At the Spa Conference in July the Germans had reluctantly undertaken reparation obligations, which they claimed could be fulfilled only if Upper Silesian coal production maintained the predicted level. Through informants in Paris, they were aware of a deep split between the British and the French in the Conference of Ambassadors.'3 They knew that their argument would find resonance in London, and the importance of Upper Silesia for Germany's ability to pay reparations remained Berlin's strongest propaganda weapon.
The failure of French troops to take effective steps against the Polish insurgents greatly upset British policymakers. In September Curzon made the first of several unsuccessful attempts to force the dismissal of Le Rond. Le Rond came to Paris and defended his actions so adeptly that the British were left isolated in the Conference of Ambassadors. They had to content themselves with a few procedural changes within the plebiscite commission.'4 Although the commission managed to restore its authority in Upper Silesia, the success of the uprising enabled the Poles to abandon their former delaying tactics and to, press for a quick plebiscite.'5 The Germans, however, after having lost their security police and much of their election organization, tried to postpone the plebiscite until they could remap their strategy.
Through the autumn and winter of 1920-21 the question of the suffrage of nonresident voters dominated the diplomatic preparations for the plebiscite. Over the years, many people born in Upper Silesia had moved out of the area. The Treaty of Versailles gave them the right to vote in the plebiscite, largely as a result of the urging of the Polish delegation. Closer study subsequently indicated that the majority of the "outvoters" would likely vote German; as initial estimates placed their number as high as 300,000 it was conceivable that they could tip the balance for Germany."' The Poles therefore reversed their policy, bitterly opposed the suffrage of nonresidents, and argued that only current 13 The Struggle for Upper Silesia 371 a hard blow for the Catholic cause in Germany. In addition, he claimed that in the probable case of a renewed outbreak of Soviet-Polish fighting the Bolsheviks would occupy and control Upper Silesia if it were part of Poland, whereas they would respect the international boundary if it were part of Germany. Therefore, giving Upper Silesia to Poland meant running a greater risk that it would be Bolshevized. He pleaded, as he phrased it, that the Vatican preserve its neutrality in the contest by supporting the "just" demands of the Germans. In the winter of 1920-21 that meant supporting the suffrage of nonresident voters, delaying the plebiscite until spring when the outvoters could travel to Upper Silesia more easily, and opposing any division of the area into zones for voting purposes.26 As has been seen, all these demands were eventually won for the Germans by British diplomacy.
In conjunction with events in Upper Silesia the German ambassador at the Vatican had launched a campaign in Rome in which he had attempted to persuade Gasparri to recall Ratti from Warsaw. That request was more than Gasparri would grant.27 But the Germans did consider the sending of Ogno to Upper Silesia and the removal of Ratti's influence to be a diplomatic victory. Ogno's reports from Upper Silesia were sympathetic to the German side, and the Vatican was moved to authorize Ogno to discipline local clergy who were engaging in Polish political propaganda.28 Such was the situation in the late winter of 1920-21 as the date for the plebiscite approached. 
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Germans claimed that the decision of the plebiscite commissionnot to allow the suffrage of residents who had moved to Upper Silesia after 1904-robbed Germany of some 50,000 votes. Poles pointed out that the Germans built up their majority in the northern and western areas of the province that had never really been claimed by Poland.Y Nevertheless, the plebiscite area was exactly the same as that originally granted to Poland by the Entente in the draft treaty at Paris; and the Poles had never shown any hesitation then about their willingness to annex the entire area. In the strategic industrial region situated within the triangle Beuthen-Gleiwitz-Kattowitz (Boytom-Gliwice-Katowice), the vote was more evenly divided, with 259,000 votes recorded for Germany and 205,000 for Poland.
The mixed results of the election afforded ample opportunities for widely differing interpretations of the vote. With the exception of the Germans, everyone was agreed in principle that Upper Silesia should be divided between Germany and Poland, but it was clearly impossible to draw a boundary line without leaving national minorities on both sides. The northern and western agricultural areas had voted overwhelmingly German; in the extreme southeast the counties of Rybnik and Pless with their untapped ore reserves were clearly Polish. The communes in the industrial area, however, formed a mosaic of conflicting loyalties; the cities were German, but the outlying mining communes were Polish. The vote could therefore be interpreted according to national interests in order to support varying boundary proposals.
Neither side was completely happy with the outcome. Two days after the plebiscite, Prince Hatzfeldt wrote to Foreign Minister Simons that the results were worse for Germany than expected, that the idea of making Upper Silesia a free state was gaining popularity, and that the British and the Italians in any case would probably agree to Polish acquisition of the counties of Pless, Rybnik, and Tarnowitz (Tarnowskie Gory).32 Simons, however, contended that only one solution was acceptable for Germany-namely, the retention of the entire province, and the claim to all of Upper Silesia remained the official German The Upper Silesian situation afforded, for the first time, an opportunity for the League of Nations to demonstrate its ability to settle a key issue among the great powers. Since the permanent members of tober the matter stayed within the League of Nations, but by early October rumors began to circulate that a decision was forthcoming.
Word reached the Germans that the result would be unfavorable to them; and there was an immediate movement within the government, led by Walter Rathenau, for the resignation of the Wirth cabinet.66 The German Foreign Office did try to persuade the British to intervene once more, but all efforts in London were fruitless. Curzon pointed out that both Britain and France were obligated to accept whatever the League might decide and maintained that it would be "unfair" to influence the decision.67 On October 12 the recommendation of the League was officially communicated to the Supreme Council.
The proposal called for the drawing of the political frontier through the industrial triangle, while at the same time establishing controls that would allow the area to survive at least temporarily as an economic unit. Economic matters and minority disputes were to be handled by an "Upper Silesian Mixed Commission," to be composed equally of Germans and Poles as well as a neutral member. On the basis of population and territory, the boundary that was suggested by the League was as fair as any that had yet been proposed. Whereas the Germans had won 60 percent of the votes and 55 percent of the
